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During the early 1960s there were two related black political struggles in South 
Africa. In the towns the mainly urban-based nationalist and left-wing groups had 
adopted violent strategies which varied from controlled, selective sabotage to schemes 
for a general uprising. In the reserves, and in particular in the Transkei, there had 
developed a deep-rooted antagonism to government institutions and administrative 
measures as well as towards the Bantustan authorities which implemented them. The 
m a l  opposition was sometimes expressed in comparatively well organized and 
politically articulate mass movements, as in Pondoland in 1960. But sometimes the 
uprisings were less co-ordinated, plots and conspiracies were not linked by one 
or~zation and the opposition was more fragmentary, with the result that it has 
received less attention from historians. This has been the case with Tembuland during 
the period 1960-1965. Yet the Tembu disturbances are interesting: there was at least 
one nationalist movement concerned; they provide a good example of the links between 
rural and urban resistance against authority; there is e n o w  evidence to suggest the 
social forces involved and the reasons for their actions. This paper will first 
attempt to put the Tembu revolt into its social and historical context and then, by 
using material drawn from trial records and reports, it will examine the unrest in 
some detail. The historiography of black South African politics has often been based 
on records concerning urban groups which were led by well educated and politically 
sophisticated men. The struggles of peasants and migrant workers are not so well 
recorded and their effectiveness can be underestimated. This paper is an attempt to 
fit the Tembuland resistance into the general pattern of South African black 
opposition during the eaxly 1960s. 
In 1960, the Tembu inhabited the Elliotdale, Mqanduli, Umtata and Engcobo 
districts of the Transkei, and a related sub-group, the Emigrant Tembu, lived in the l 
Cala and St Marks districts as well as the enjoining Glen Grey, which was administered 
as part of the Ciskei. The districts form one block of territory running for 250 miles I 
across the southern portion of the Transkei. Like the rest of the Transkei, it is a 
hilly and mountainous region; it has been calculated that only 11 per cent of the 1 
Transkei is flat (1) and the land rises from a narrow coastal belt to highlands of 
between 4,000 and 5,000 feet. As mi&t be expected, communications are poor: it was l l 
pointed out at one trial that the distance between two locations could vary between I 
eight and fifty miles, depending on whether one used the circuitous road of the I 
shorter but steeper mountain paths. (2) The landscape, which is typically grass I 
covered, was found in 1966 to be 30 per cent badly eroded and 44 per cent moderately 
eroded. l 
The Transkei is densely populated# in 1960 it had an average of 92 people per 
square mile and an overall total of 1,400,000 inhabitants. Of these, approximately 
160,000 were recruited annually to work on the mines in industry and in agriculture.(4) 
In 1960, 61,237 men were employed as mineworkers. It seems reasonable to assume 
that c.25,000 people were employed in agriculture the 1971 figure of 22,383 was after 
a decade of reducing the number of black farm workers in the Western cape). (6) The 
rest would mainly have been recruited by labour bureaux for industries and services in 
the urban areas. Francis Wilson reports that in 1972 69 per cent of the men recruited 
worked in the Cape Town area, 18 per cent in the Transvaal, and small proportions 
elsewhere: the proportions would not have changed greatly over ten years. (7) Those 
who worked in the mines were restricted by the compound system, but the men m d  women 
who worked in industry were more exposed to urban political influences,and it is 
therefore worth emphasizing that the majority of this sector were migrants between the 
Transkei and the Western Cape. 
With the exception of a small number of government servants, the 
population (including migrant workers, families) either depended to a lesser or greater 
extent on wages remitted by migrants or were able to produce e n o w  food from farms to 
subsist. Evidence from a survey conducted in the 1970s and cited by Innes and OtMeara 
suggests that the proportion of the Transkei population which never or only seldom 
depended on migrant labour is very small: it is unlikely that it would have been much 
greater in the 1960s. (8) The government had then only recently begun to concentrate 
holdings so as to create a class of self-sufficient peasant farmers. This measure, 
while creating a class that could prosper without migrant earnings, also necessitated 
depriving 113,000 Transkeian families of land altogether, making them wholly dependent 
on the urban labour market. (9) 
Until 1955 the Transkei was governed throw a conciliar system which, 
as the African National Congress1 activist, Govan Mbeki, pointed out, depended on a 
degree of popular participation. The Glen Grey Act had set up the Bun@ system in 
which 26 district councils sent representatives to a general council or Bunga in 
Umtata. The district councils each had six members: in the districts which had 
paramount chiefs (which included Tembuland and  ond do land) two were elected and four 
were nominees of the chief and the district commissioner. Of the representatives sent 
to the Bunga, one was elected and the others were nominees. (10) Most Bunga members 
were chiefs or headmen but over half of them were elected: chiefs under the Bunga 
system derived some of their authority from popular support. (11) 
The abolition of this system and the introduction in the Transkei of the 
Bantu Authorities in 1955 reduced the importance of the elected element in the tribal, 
district, regiona,l, and territorial authorities, and increased the powers of the chiefs 
within the authorities (to which they belonged ex officio) as well as adding to their 
administrative functions. Chiefs, duties were to include maintaining the law, 
reporting unrest and implementing any government measures. They were also given 
increased judicial responsibilities and were allowed to keep part of the revenue raised 
in fines and fees. (12) Most important of all they were placed in opposition to their 
people by being made responsible for establishing land rehabilitation measures. These 
involved the fencing of land, the consolidation (and hence confiscation) of faxming 
plots, contour ploughing, leaving land fallow and stock-culling. African political 
organizations opposed them from their inception in 1945: they argued that all the 
measures did was to create a landless peasantry and that the real causes of African 
rural poverty lay not in overstocking but in the insufficient area of farming land 
allocated for African use. The measures were naturally unpopular with the individual 
farmer: even if he did not face the threat of being deprived of his land, the stock- 
culling could often be arbitrary and inefficient, falling as heavily on the man with a 
few cows as the owner of a large herd. Dipping tanks were disliked as these were 
sometimes used to enforce culling and castration as well as a way for the chiefs to 
collect unofficial levies. (13) Land reclamation schemes which insisted on the 
provision of fallow land appeared to be another measure aimed at peasant 
impoverishment. (14) Rewards were given to chiefs who accepted the system, and in the 
Transkei Territorial Assembly they resolved to allot themselves each an extra portion 
of arable land "to enable [the chiefb] to provide hospitalityn. (l$) 
However, when describing developments in specific regions of the Transkei, 
it is difficult to generalize about the role of the chiefs. Mbeki says that by 1955 
people in the Transkei "had developed to a stage which discards chieftainship". (16) 
Innes and O'Meara's tentative analysis of Transkeian class formation views chiefs and 
headmen as a basis of a rich peasantry. To their traditional function in allocating 
arable land was added the opportunity to avail themselves of larger plots held on a 
quit rent basis from the state. But this repressive role was not a l w s  willingly 
assumed by the chiefs during the early 1960s. In May 1961 over 1,000 Tembu chiefs 
condemned the rehabilitation scheme (the "Native  rust^^) at a meeting called by Sabata 
Dalindyebo, the paramount chief. Tembuland was almost completely free of 
rehabilitation at that time. (17) Contact mentions in its report "good" chiefs who 
had delwed imposing the scheme by insisting that they should act as their people 
required them to. In contrast to this, in the district of St Marks which was under 
the authority of the Emigrant Tembu Chief and Chairman of the Transkei Territorial 
Authority, Kaiser Matmima, the scheme was "acceptedl1 at meetings held in locations 
in 1960. The meetings were called by the District Magistrate and he later claimed 
that the proposals were accepted by everybody at the meetings. Rather inconsistently 
he also said that after the proposals had been accepted "100 per centf1 illegal meetings 
began to be held all over the district and a number of people belonging to anti- 
rehabilitation groups were arrested. (18) He also made the interesting admission that 
compensation was not paid to those who had been removed from the land until the last 
person had moved tlvoluntarily". (19) Matamha's district was to include the site of 
a large show-piece irrigation scheme. 2,400 consolidated farming plots were to be 
produced,and from trial evidence we know that people were being displaced from the 
land from 1962. (20) 
Though the Tembu chiefs seemed in 1962 to have shown e n o u  concern for 
their populazity to suggest that they still had a following to lose, this did not 
inrply that the Tembu were apathetic politically. It is worth remembering that in 1936 
the African vote in Tembuland (as a Cape constituency) was the highest in the Cape 
Province, being one-third of the total. (21) Organized radical political gmups had 
certainly concentrated their efforts in towns but there was a considerable amount of 
political activity in the Transkei during the 1940s and 1950s. Tabatats account of 
the development of the All African Convention surely overstates the case when he says 
"During this period 61948-1960 the people [of the ~ranskei] had been fired by the new 
policy of the Unity Movementll t 22), but the nature of the AACls federal structure 
could have given it a degree of influence. The AAC was not a party which one could 
join individually. It was a federation of organizations not all of which were 
especially political. This rather loose qlumbrellalf structure was able to absorb 
special and regional interest groups and yet have a fairly coherent political line. 
Affiliated to the AAC was the Cape African Teachers' Association which opposed, until 
its banning, Bantu Education (23), the Transkei Organised Bodies which organized with 
the African National Congress electoral boycotts of the Native Representative 
Council (24), and the Kongo movement which affiliated itself to the AAC in 1948 after 
being started in Pondoland to oppose rehabilitation. (25) The African National 
Congress was, throughout the 1950s, uninterested in a reserve-based strategy: Mbeki, 
himself a Tramkeian, ruefully noted that it was not until the Pondoland revolt of 
1960 that the ANC saw "the vital need for linking up the struggles of the peasants 
with those of the workers in the urban areas". (26) More information is needed on 
the various bodies and campaigns Tabata mentions, but their existence indicates a 
degree of political consciousness in the villages of the Transkei (for AAC 
organizations were often based on village committees) that was well developed before 
1960. 
The following factors could have conditioned the violent Tembu resistance 
after 1960. First, there was the increasing dependence of the Transkeim peasantry 
on migrant labour earnings. This was coupled with their increasing insecurity on the 
land as the rehabilitation programme empowered chiefs and officials to remove families 
from their holdings. In 1960 in Tembuland proper this was still just a threat, but 
the experience of the Rnigrant Tabu would have reinforced fears and the chiefs' stand 
against rehabilitation probably concentrated anti-government feeling. Organized 
political opposition to the land reforms had existed in the Transkei for a couple of 
decades, though the extent to which this affected the response in Tembuland after 
1960 is difficult to say. Another important factor must have been the eqerience of 
the migrant workers. As I have said, those who were industrial workers (and therefore 
most open to urban political influence) mainly migrated to the Western Cape. The Tembu 
and Emigrant Tembu were likely to have been the majority of these: they were 
geographically closest and were linked by rail to Cape Town (a large proportion of 
Pondo migrants worked in ~atal). (27) In 1960, the Western Cape and particularly Cape 
Town saw the most widespread disturbances in the weeks following Sbarpeville: a 
general strike supported by the African labour force for nearly two weeks, and a 
dramatic march of between fifteen and thirty thousand men from Langa location to the 
centre of Cape Town. What was noticed by commentatom at the time was that migrant 
workers from l1bachelorl1 quarters in the locations played a leading role. During the 
crisis the Pan-Africanist Congress provided some political direction,& again 
contemporary evidence suggests that it was especially influential in the migrant 
workers' hostels and llaonesll. With the ANC,the PAC was suppressed but out of its 
branches developed a violent insurrectionary movement called m. Poqo_ is a Xhosa 
word meaning alone or pure. The movement first developed in the locations round Cape 
Town and smaller towns in the Western Cape and drew most of its support from migrant 
workers. (28) Though there could have been other political influences affecting 
migrant reactions (~ongress-affiliated trade unions were quite active in the Western 
Cape in the 1950s), it is probable that PAC/PO~O had the greatest impact on Western 
Cape Xhosa-speaking migrant workers in the years following Sharpeville. 
In outline, the Tembu disturbances were sporadic and disjointed though, like 
the Pondo revolt, they were sustained over a surprisingly long period. It is important 
to remember that much of the unrest in Tembu areas occurred under the conditions imposed 
on the Transkei by Proclamation 400. This, from 30 November 1960, provided for a sate 
of Emergency. The regulations included detention without trial, the baming of 
virtually all meetings and the extension of the powers of chiefs and headmen. People 
who challenged chiefs? authority could be fined or imprisoned and have some of their 
livestock confiscated. The proclamation was published in immediate response to the 
Pondo uprising. 
Before looking at the resistance in any detail, an overall chronology is 
useful. In 1956, in the &xigrant Tembu districts of Cala and Glen Grey people tried 
to prevent the installation of pro-government chiefs. (29) This followed the 
establishment of the Bantu Authorities system the previous year. In Tembuland itself 
there was considerable opposition to Bantu Authorities. A delegation had been sent to 
Pretoria to protest against their implementation, and in 1958 four Tabu leaders, 
including an adviser to the Paramount Chief, Sabata, were exiled. The Tembuland 
chiefs? attitude to Bantu Authorities and other government measures was to be influenced 
by the rivalry between the Pamount and Natam.ima, the regional chief of the Emigrant 
Tembu. Matwima had gained government support through his backing of the Bantu 
Authorities and he was busy expanding the area of his authority. In 1958 the Ciskeian 
district of Glen Grey was put under his control. (30) 
Really widespread opposition to the government came with the attempt to 
impose land rehabilitation on the Tembu. As we have seen, illegal committees sprang 
up in. the St Marks district, and these continued to hold their meetings from 1960 until 
1963. The St Marks magistrate said that this occurred most often in 1960-1961 and, 
while there was "a spell of quietnessn in 1962, the meetings were revived in 1963. (31) 
At these meetings rehabilitation measures were denounced; counter-measures decided 
upon were not always illegal. The men in Wtsi location, St Marks, initially intended 
to hire an attorney who would help them to oppose the fencing; for this they each 
paid 25 cents. (32) The anti-rehabilitation groups were usually drawn from a single 
location. 
Though the majority of chiefs in Tembuland were at this stage unwilling to 
enforce government measures, there were exceptions. Patrick Lawrence mentions the 
killing of a pro-government chief and eleven other people, as well as the b d n g  down 
of a census building on an occasion in 1960. (33) More details would be useful, for 
it is tempting to link the destruction of the census building with the surveys which, 
from 1956, consolidated allotments and created large numbers of landless people. (34) 
In January 1961 a headman was murdered at Rwantsana near Lady Frere. hrentually 
thirty-five men were charged. The murder was preceded by the killing of three of the 
headmanls sheep. Headmen had recently been given the power to confiscate livestock, 
under Proclamation 400, and this was fiercely resented by villagers. (35) It was not 
considered to be a legitimate right. In the 1950s there developed a movement called 
the Makuluspan (it was started in the Tsolo district, adjacent to ~mtata) which was 
formed to combat stock theft. Hammond Tooke claims that its influence grew when B&u 
Authorities were imposed and it increasingly threatened chiefs as it became more 
politically orientated. (36) In 1962, the police were claiming that tribesmen were 
"taking the law into their own hands to deal w i t h  stock thieves" in the Umtata and 
Ehgcobo districts. (37) One can speculate that the Makuluspan was being directed 
against headmen who confiscated livestock, though there is not enough evidence to 
prove this. It is surely significant that Poqo was reported as using the Makuluspan 
movement to "intimidate peoplell. (38) I. B. Tabata said in November 1963 that the AAC 
had "won overw the Makuluspan in the preceding six months. (39) Though this seems 
unlikely as it was not the sort of organization which could be formally incorporated, 
both Snymanls allegation about Poqo and Makulspan and Tabatafs claim do show that one 
should not regard the small local conspiracies against unpopular individuals in 
isolation from the more overtly political opposition. 
The murder of headmen and chiefs was to be a fairly frequent occurrence 
during the period. In March 1961 two more headmen were killed in Tembuland (40), and 
such incidents may have helped to influence some of the thousand chiefs who opposed 
rehabilitation schemes at Sabatals palace in Bumbane on May 6. (41) Similar large 
meetings were held in May the following year to condemn the Bantu authorities. (42) 
As well as the intimidation of chiefs, locations also withheld taxes: an early report 
of this was in Macibini, Glen Grey, in January 1961, when 100 people were arrested for 
non-papnent of the 1960 poll tax. (43) 
Late in 1962 there were three attempts on Matamimats life. One will be 
described in detail below. All three were Poqo-inspired. The first attack was on 
October 14, and in the weeks before there were reports of Poqo "preaching race hate" 
to the peasantry in migrant Tembuland. (44) Trials provide evidence of Poqo 
organization from 1961 to 1963 in the Ehgcobo district and the Ngqeleni district (on 
the coast, north of ~qanduli) as well as Emigrant Tembuland. Forty-eight men were 
imprisoned for Poqo activities in Ngqeleni (45), and in Ehgcobo Chief Nkosana Mtirara, 
a member of the Tembu royal house, was found guilty of leading, in collaboration with 
the local sChool-teacher, a Poqo cell of thirty-five men. (46) Poqo activities included 
the Bashee bridge murders which took place on February 5. A white family were killed 
in an attack on their caravan by men who, according to the police, cane from Mqanduli, 
Cofimvaba, Kentani and Bityi. The men used petrol bombs and firearms as well as 
pangas. (47) It was especially brutal: when headmen were attacked, although their 
kraal would be destroyed, their families were usually left unharmed. 
In 1963 the Engcobo and Umtata districts were said by police to be the most 
violent districts in the Transkei. More Poqo arrests had been made in this area than 
elsewhere. Police activity was also very intensive and para-military mobile units were 
created to suppress disturbances. (48) This hi& level of illegal and violent 
opposition coincided with the organization of legal political opposition to the 
government and to Matamima, who had become chairman of the Traslskei Territorial 
Authority in 1961 and was campaigning to be elected as chief minister. He was opposed 
by Paramount Chief Victor Poto of West Pondoland, who was supported by Sabata Dalindyebo. 
Sabatals official candidates in the election formed the basis of the Democratic Party. 
It has been suggested that the Democratic Party represented a petty bourgeoisie of 
shopkeepers, owners of services, teachers and bureaucrats who were largely concentrated 
in the small urban centres. (49) This seems a bit tendentious: the almost complete 
victory of Sabata candidates throuout Tembuland was surely a symptom of the 
consciously political character of the unrest that affected the whole rural population. 
Another political group which played some part in helping to organize the legal Tembu 
opposition to Matanzima was the multiracial Liberal Party. On the whole, they worked 
through chiefs and other prominent figures in the comity: they did not attempt to 
build a branch membership in the Transkei. (50) 
1963 seems to have been the peak of peasant unrest and Poqo activity in 
Tembuland. In 1961 the much better organized Pondo struggle had been suppressed by 
ruthless police action, and by 1964 conditions were less favourable for revolt: 
previously sympathetic chiefs were being intimidated or induced by IWtamima to switch 
sides, and a drou&t began that year, which was to last until 1969 and which was to 
force 35,000 Transkeians off the land and kill 20 per cent of the cattle. (51) This 
must have contributed to the demoralisation of popular resistance, though there were 
still occasional outbreaks: in 1964 a chief who had recently decided to support 
Matamima was killed in Gcaleka (52), and in 1965 there was Poqo activity in Mqanduli l 
I as well as Pondola.nd. By now, however, the Poqo men seem to have been less concerned 
with acting on local issues: rather, they were trying to create base areas for a 
guerrilla movement which was going to be sustained from Lesotho, where the PACIs 
I external leadership could provide some sort of training. (53) 
l 
l 
I Before making amy generalizations about the unrest, a closer look at two of the incidents helps to give a clearer understanding of what was happening in the Tembu 
districts. The first is the Poqo attempt to assassinate Matanzima, and the second a 
much more localized incident concerning the murder of a village headman. 
1 
On 12 December 1962, a group of between twenty and thirty Poqo members 
travelled by train from Cape Town to the Trmskei, with the intention of assembling 
with other p u p s  near W t a  and launching a co-ordinated attack on Christmas Day on 
Matanzimals palace. According to the trial evidence, similar groups had already 
left. (54) Most of the -twenty men later put on trial had been Poqo members since early 
1961, but though there had been several meetings in the previous months the immediate 
I preparations for the attack were only discussed at a meeting in Langa township on 
December 10. At this and subsequent meetings members were told to contribute 66 for 
the railway ticket and collect weapons. The attack was going to incorporate the 
freeing of prisoners in Qamata jail who had been captured in earlier attempts on 
Matanzimafs life. On the night before their departure a herbalist doctored the men by 
I making incisions on their foreheads and rubbing in herbs. (55) Their weapons, which 
l included a revolver carried by the cellfs leader, were also treated. 
I 
Thus prepared, the men entrained the following morning. Most of them had 
not had the chance to give their employers any excuse for leaving their jobs and so, 
as well as forfeiting their pa~r packets, had come away without getting their pass books 
signed. Their trains arrived at Queenstown at 7.00 p.m. on the 13th. Here it was 
obvious that the police had been warned because they ordered everybody off the train 
and made them line up on the platfom,where they began searching the passengers for 
weapons. On their discovery of a panga, the Poqo men made a concerted attack on the 
police, killing one of them and wounding several others. After a few minutes of 
fighting, police reinforcements arrived and the Poqo men retreated and tried to escape 
to a nearby hillside. Most were captured within the next day or two. Another group 
who had journeyed from Cape Town a few days earlier had succeeded in reaching Ntlonze 
mountain, near Cofinnraba, the rallying-point for the attackers (56), but by now large 
impis and police units were searching the hills and the attack was not made. 
l The conspirators were all migrant workers; most of them did unskilled work in the construction industry or in various factories. They were mainly Emigrant Tembu 
and their home villages or districts included Glen Grey, Alice, Cala, St Marks, Qamata 
and Tsomo. Their wives and families were mentioned in the evidence as living in those 
places. It is clear that they regarded the Transkei as their home, and the evidence 
describing the various Poqo meetings in Langa indicates that they shared the same 
anxieties and preoccupations as the rural Tembu population. One was arrested with a 
letter from his mother in his pocket which contained a reference to his land being 
taken away (57); this was a predominating theme at meetings in Langa: 
The first thing he [Matanzima] did was to in.tmduce 
fencing and now he is moving huts and kraal~ to some 
other place. It appears that he has sold the plots 
where the kraals were to the Europeans because there 
are huts there." Now he is assaulting us . . . (58) 
Chief Phtanzima has sold our land; we are going to 
kill him. (59) 
The fencing and the activities of the Native (~ehabilitation) Trust in St Marks began 
to be discussed at Langa Poqo meetings in July 1962. 
That the Poqo men were closely in touch with local realities is borne. out 
by the second incident,which again arose out of conditions in the St Marks district. 
As we have seen, discontent with land rehabilitation had led to the formation of secret 
village committees. In the middle of February 1963 the authorities tried to suppress 
these groups. In Qitsi the local headman was provided with some police from Qamata, 
and with these and other men he raided the kraals of leading critics of the land 
measures. Their houses were destroyed and some of their stock was taken. (60) However, 
the anti-trust men had already left Qitsi and found shelter in a kraal in Qulugu, 
Engcobo district, eight miles away across the hills. Quite apart from the headmanls 
action, there was considerable anger in Qitsi because Matanzima had sent a large impi 
which included fifty policemen to search the area (possibly for Poqo men) and the 
location had had to provide food for them. There had also been removals. Though the 
headman was known to be rather reluctant to do so, he had had to organize the fencing: 
he had thus become "the man who informs the people about the regulations". (61) The 
bitterness of the feeling against him can be judged from the fact that among the men 
who killed him were two nephews and a man known to be "a very great friend" of the 
headman. (62) 
These men decided to kill the headman when they were at Wugu. Rather 
inexplicably, they sent him a threatening letter which resulted in him being given a 
bodyguard and a revolver. The group at Qulugu were first treated by a herbalist who 
made incisions on their arms, foreheads and cheek-bones. Then, on the night of the 
26th, they marched to Qitsi, overpowered the bodyguards, dragged the headman out of 
his kraal and killed him. His family were allowed to leave the hut, which was then 
burned down. There had been no attempt at secrecy (the bodyguards were allowed to get 
a m )  and shortly afterwards the conspirators were arrested. 
There is a consistency in the details of these and other incidents during 
the Tembu unrest. Both conspiracies involved men who were, or had been, migrant 
workers (the Q,itsi men were, with one exception, over thirty, and some of them had 
spent long periods in Cape  own). In both events there was a certain amount of 
traditional ritual used in the preparations. In both, the politically inspired Poqo 
men and the apolitical Qitsi group, the men felt threatened by the land rehabilitation 
scheme. 
The involvement of Poqo in Tembu unrest is an indication of how local 
discontent could become consciously political. Poqo was not a movement that was 
brought into the Transkei by outsiders: its chief following was among migrant workers. 
It could be adapted to local traditions, beliefs and institutions. One man said at his 
trial that he had joined Poqo and "its sort of church, Q,amatal' in 1961: Qamata is 
mentioned by Philip Ma,yer as a high god or ruler of the spirits that was commonly a 
feature of Red (trsiditionalist) Xhosa religious belief. (63) Nationalist politics 
had not previously gained much of a following among Red Xhosa migrants. The report 
that Poqo was linked to the Ma?suluspan and the existence of a Poqo soup which was led 
by an Eqpobo chief are further indications of the considerable degree of support it 
*S the Europeans were experts who were there to construct a dam as part of the 
&amata irrigation scheme (see p. 3). 
must have had in Tembuland and the smunding districts.* 
The Tembu Listurbances lacked the coherence, unity and dramatic quality of 
the Pondo revolt. Unlike the Pondo, they evolved no cleax strategy nor did they 
fonrmlate a series of d e m d s  that went beyond the immediate causes of their hardships. 
Though one should not overestimate the part played in the events by Poqo, this 
weakness was very much its own: it was an insurrectionary movement which saw politics 
in the apocalyptic terms of a general uprising. This contrasts with .the Pondo store 
boycott which discriminated between those traders reckoned to be sympathetic and those 
who openly sided .with the government. (64) 
One point should be made about the migrant workers. These men were not ybt 
fully proletasiaulized: they were not completely "freeN of access to the means of 
production. Consciously they still felt that land, rehabilitation measures were a 
threat to their livelihood. Though the men who set out from Cape Town to attack 
Matamima would probably have been destined to spend most of their working lives in 
the Langa hostels, nevertheless they were going to kill Matwima because he was 
taking away their land. It has been suggested that different experience of oppression 
for the worker, on the one hand, and his family in the reserve, on the other, 
introduces "a structural division in the heart of the proletariat". The worker would 
focus his opposition on the relations of production in the towns, while rural people 
would attack chiefs and headmen. (65) But in the 1960s this was not the case; 
migrants, then, were not so detached from rural consciousness. T o d .  things mi&t be 
different: when people are forced off the land completely so that their entire 
subsistence depends on mig~ant wages, and when the migrant worker does not have the 
remotest prospect of ceasing to work in the towns and returning to his cattle and land, 
then perhaps he has become a member of an urban proletariat. In the early 1960s his 
situation was a transitional one. 
1% is in this context that his political reactions should be looked at. At 
a time when the stay-away from work was the chief weapon of the nationalist movement, 
migrant workers hitherto had been considered apathetic politically, and the scale of 
their response to the Pan-Africanist Congress pass campaign in 1960 surprised witnesses 
in Cape Town. Eere they were responding to the frustrations of urban conditions: low 
wages, influx control, sepaxation from their families and police raids. They could 
also be concerned about agricultural conditions: drought, rain, cattle sickness and 
the state of the fields. (66) This divided response could have been capitalized on by 
a well organized political movement. Poqo was not that; it was an expression of a 
general desperation felt both in the reserves and in the locations, not a vanguard 
organization. Thou& it was inspired by the Pan-Africdst leadership, it did not 
develop an organizational structure: this was scarcely surprising for in some 
locations whole barracks would join en bloc. (67) There was therefore no central 
leadership which could be sensitive to local conditions and base a long-term strategy 
on them. 
As well as the state of transition that the migrant worker found himself in 
during the 1960~~ the role of the chiefs was also changing and this ambivalence in 
their position contributed to the conditions for revolt. The popularity of certain 
chiefs in Tabuland, the participation of one of their number in Poqo, even the Qitsi 
headman's lack of enthusiasm for implementing rehabilitation, show that the 
++E thou& all illegal PAC groups were called Poqo cells, those in the Transvaal 
seem to have been rather different. They did not have the same depee of 
participation by migrant workers (I have found no reports of Poqo activities in other 
 antu us tans) and they were far more closely controlled by the external leadership. 
They were neither as numerous nor as active. 
transformation from consensus gatherer to government functionary was not a l m s  
undertaken willingly. Certainly their change in function seems to have deprived them 
of some legitimacy: their actions were an offence against tradition and custom. The 
use of ritual and traditional beliefs by the Poqo movement and the Wtsi villagers 
l 
was significant. 
The Tembu disturbances arose out of specific historical circumstances. It 
would be a mistake to make any dogmatic assertions from them about the role of peasants 
and migrants in the liberation struggle; their situation is not a static one. The 
disturbances, though brutal, were small scale; revolt was intermittent and 
disorganized$ such opposition was easily crushed. For all that, they are worth 
recording, for they were part of a generalized resistance to authority which usually 
appears only incidentally in the histories of formal organizations and in the 
biographies of political leaders. There is the daslger that the history of the African 
opposition in those years mi&t become merely the story of saboteurs, guerrillas and 
exiled politicians. The very lack of such glamorous qualities in the Tembu 
disturbances is what makes them interesting: they were spontaneous and populm. As 
such, they indicate a susceptibility to revolt in rural areas which must be seen as a 
lost opportunity for the African nationalist leadership. 
Notes 
(1) Randolph Vigne, The Transkei - a South African Tragedy (The Africa Bureau, n.d.) 
P* 5. 
(2) State v. Nomapolisa Me ji and 22 others. Transcript.  utterwo worth) 21.8.1963, 
p. 8. 
(3) Vigne, op. cit. 
(4) Govan Mbeki , The Peasants 1 Revolt (~amondsworth, 1964)~ p. 19. 
(5) l?cancis Wilson, M i m t  Labour in South Africa (Johannesburg, 1972), p. 96. 
(6) Ibid., p. 18. 
(7) Ibid., P. 96. 
(8) Innes and OWeara, llClass Formation and Ideology: the Transkei Regionf1, Review 
of African Political Econow, Sept .-Dec. 1976, p. 72. 
(9) Mbeki, op. cit., p. 76. Innes and O'Meara, op. cit., p. 74. 
(10) For a full description of the system, see Mbekifs account in The Peasantls 
Revolt, pp. 34-35. 
(11) Patrick Lawrence, The Transkei (Johannesburg, 1976), p. 31. 
(12) Mbeki, op. cit . , p. 101. 
(13) I. B. Tabata, The Awakeniw of a Peo-ole (~ottingham, 1974), p. 45. 
(14) Mbeki, op. cit., p. 96. 
(15) Ibid., P. 75. 
(16) Ibid., p. 47. 
(17) Contact, 18.5.1961, p. 5. 
(18) State v. Nomapolisa Me ji, p. 74. 
(19) Ibid., p. 70. 
(20) Barbara Rogers, The f Bantu Homelands 1 (~efence and Aid, 1973), p. 28. 
(21) Mbeki, 09. ci t . ,  p. 21. 
(22) I. B. Tabata, Imperialist Conspiracy i n  Africa (~usaka,  1974), p. 17. 
(23) Tabata, The Awakeniw of a People, p. 75. 
(24) Ibid., p. 70. 
(25) Baruch Hirson, "Rural Revolt in South African in Oollected Seminar Papers on 
The Societies of Southern Africa i n  the 19th & 20th Centuries, Volume 8 (ICS, 
CSP No. 22. 
(26) Mbeki, op. c i t . ,  p. 129. 
(27) N a t a l  sugar estates  were important labour recruiters.  See Wilson, op. cit . ,  p.18. 
(28) I have described t h i s  more ful ly i n  a paper shortly t o  appear i n  Collected Papers, 
University of York, Vol. 111, eds. H i l l  and Akeroyd. 
(29) Lawrence, op. c i t . ,  p. 36. 
(30) Mbeki, op. c i t . ,  p. 36. 
(31) State v. Nomapolisa Me ji, p. 74. 
(32) Ibid., P. 44. 
(33) Lawrence, op. c i t . ,  p. 37. 
(34) Govan Mbeki, "The Transkei Tragedyft, Liberation, September 1956, p. 10. 
(36) Hammond-Tooke, Command o r  Consensus. The Develoment of Transkei Local Government, 
p. 106, quoted by Lawrence, op. c i t . ,  p. 36. 
(37) Cape Arm, 10 September 1963. 
(38) Commission Report on Events on 20-22 November 1962 at Paarl ( ~ q m a a  ~ e p o r t ) ,  
pma. 113. 
Tabata, Imperialist Conspiracy i n  Africa, p. 37. 
Contact, 9 W c h  1961, p. 5. 
Ibid., l 8  MW 1961, p. 5. 
Lawrence, op. c i t . ,  p. 64. 
Contact, 25 February 1961. 
Ibid., 1 November 1962. 
Cape Times, 17 September 1963. 
Cape Arms, 28 August 1963. 
M. Rorrell  (ed), Survey of Race Relations (~ohannesburg, 1963), p. 19. 
Cape A ~ P ' u ~ ,  10 A u g u s t  1963. 
(49) Innes and OtMeara, 0x1. c i t . ,  p. 79. 
(50) Patrick Duncan Papers ( ~ n i v e r s i t y  of ~ o r k ) ,  "Report on Journey Round South Africa, 
29 July-20 August 196OW, 8.39 .l, and "Diary of a Journey t o  Transkei, April 1962", 
8.39.6. Duncan did not join the PAC u n t i l  he l e f t  South Africa. The South 
African authorities accused him and other Liberals of encoumging Poqo ac t iv i t i e s  
i n  the Transkei, but t h i s  seems highly unlikely. 
(51) Vigne, op. c i t . ,  p. 21. 
(52) Lawrence, 013. c i t . ,  p. 73. 
(53) State v. Alex Nikelo and Mamfengu Fholisa, Grahamstown, 14 June 1967. 
(54) State v. Ngoongolo and 19 others, CC 9/63, p. 579. 
(55) Ibid. , P* 581- 
(56) Cape Times, 9 November 1967. 
(57) State  v. Ngcongolo, p. 611. 
(58) Ibid., P. 579. 
(59) Ibid., P. 581. 
(60) State v. Nomapolisa Me j i ,  p. 20. 
(61) Ibid., p. 68. 
(62) Ibid., p, 27. 
(63) Philip and Iona Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen (cape Town, 1974), p. 157. 
(64) Anon., "The Mpondo Revolt 196OV, seminar paper, nod., p. 26. 
(65) Innes and OtMeara, op. cit., p. 82. 
(66) Monica Wilson and Archie Mafe je, Laws (cape Town, 1963), p. 18. 
(67) See Snyman Report for reference to events in Paarl, where a whole barrack was 
able to be isolated as Poqo members. A trial (state v. Fundele Ellison Maseku, 
EC 5/66) in H m d o r p  in 1966 concerned the formation of a Poqo branch in the 
small Eastern Province town of Steynsburg. Out of an African male population 
of 200, 60 were said to be Poqo members. 
All trial transcripts are from the Centre for Southern African Studies Documentation 
Project collection held at the University of York Library. 
